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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by Appellant Barry Gibbs 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is before us on a certificate of appealability that we issued on the 
following question: “whether the District Court erred in denying Gibbs’s claim that the 
Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict finding him 
guilty of two separate conspiracies.”  Order, Apr. 29, 2014, Gibbs v. Shannon, et al., No. 
13-4402 (3d Cir. 2014).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of Gibbs’s habeas corpus petition. 
I.  
  We briefly summarize the relevant background, reserving our discussion of 
additional facts as they become pertinent to our analysis below.  On March 27, 1984, 
Sharon Burke, aided by several co-conspirators, solicited Gibbs to murder her husband, 
Wayne Burke.  After Gibbs agreed to be the shooter, Sharon Burke provided him with a 
gun, explained the layout of the security office where her husband worked, and drove him 
to the scene.  At her house and during the trip to the security office, Sharon Burke 
explained that another security officer, George Mehl, would also be on duty that night, 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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and if necessary, Gibbs should be prepared to shoot or kill Mehl, too, if he interfered with 
Gibbs’s effort to kill Wayne Burke.  Gibbs assented to take out Mehl, if necessary.  Once 
at the security office, Gibbs approached a side window and fired six shots at the two 
guards.  Mehl was hit in the head and died.  Wayne Burke, however, was unharmed.     
 Shortly thereafter, Gibbs was charged in a criminal information with five separate 
counts stemming from the shooting: one count of attempted criminal homicide as to 
Wayne Burke, one count of criminal homicide for the death of Mehl,1 two counts of 
criminal conspiracy to commit homicide (one for each intended victim), and one count of 
aggravated assault as to Wayne Burke.   
 There then ensued protracted proceedings that included three separate trials, 
numerous state court appeals, two federal habeas proceedings, and two prior appeals to 
our Court.  We described the lengthy procedural history of this case in Gibbs v. Frank,  
and a brief review is helpful in framing our analysis now: 
Three times a jury has convicted Gibbs of the same criminal 
homicide.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated Gibbs’ 
first conviction after concluding that certain statements he 
made to the police were induced in violation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights.  At Gibbs’ first trial, a government 
psychiatrist who had conducted a court-ordered examination 
of Gibbs testified about statements made by Gibbs to the 
psychiatrist; the psychiatrist's testimony was presented to 
rebut Gibbs’ diminished capacity defense.  At Gibbs’ second 
trial, the government psychiatrist again testified about Gibbs' 
statements.  But at the second trial Gibbs did not raise a 
diminished capacity defense.  Accordingly, on habeas corpus, 
this Court set aside Gibbs’ second conviction, ruling that 
                                              
1 The original information charged Gibbs with the attempted murder of George 
Mehl.  A second information changed that charge from attempted murder to homicide. 
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Gibbs’ statements to the psychiatrist in a court-ordered 
examination were compelled, and hence the presentation of 
the psychiatrist’s testimony as part of the government’s 
affirmative case—i.e., in a non-rebuttal setting—violated 
Gibbs’ Fifth Amendment rights.  
 
500 F.3d 202, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 After vacating his second conviction, we ordered that he be retried or released.  Id.   
During the course of this trial, two of his co-conspirators, Bonnie Hagen2 and Betsy 
Burke, testified against him.  On July 5, 2005, the jury convicted Gibbs of third degree 
murder and conspiracy to commit third degree murder for killing Mehl, and aggravated 
assault and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault for attempting to shoot Wayne 
Burke.3  On September 2, 2005, Gibbs was sentenced to a prison term of 10 to 20 years 
on the third degree murder conviction, and consecutive 5 to 10 year prison terms on the 
two conspiracy convictions and the aggravated assault conviction, for an aggregate prison 
sentence of 25 to 50 years.   
 On direct appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Gibbs argued that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain both conspiracy convictions.  On February 14, 2007, 
the Superior Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion.  In 
addressing Gibbs’s conspiracy convictions, the Superior Court explained: 
                                              
2 Bonnie Hagen has been referred to as “Bonnie Hagen-Sullivan,” “Bonnie Hagan-
Sullivan,” and “Bonnie Sullivan.”  We refer to her as “Bonnie Hagen,” which is the 
spelling indicated in the transcript from Gibbs’s third criminal trial.  (App. at 409.)   
 
3 Although Gibbs was charged with two counts of conspiracy to commit murder, 
the trial court determined that the count implicating Wayne Burke should be reduced to 
conspiracy to commit aggravated assault because it “is a lesser included offense of 




In the present case, the Commonwealth’s evidence was 
sufficient to establish the existence of two different 
conspiracies, one to murder Mr. Burke and the other to harm 
Mr. Mehl if it became necessary to shoot Mr. Burke.  The 
objective of the first conspiracy was Mr. Burke’s murder.  
This conspiracy started in February 1984 and continued until 
the evening of the actual shooting, March 27, 1984.  Over the 
two months preceding the shooting, when only Mr. Burke’s 
murder was being planned, discussions occurred among 
Sharon Burke, Bonnie Hagan-Sullivan, Hagan-Sullivan’s then 
boyfriend, Gary Huth, and her friends, Connie Stein and 
Jennie Dean.  The active participants in this conspiracy were 
Sharon Burke, Hagan-Sullivan, and Dean.  Conversations 
with Appellant concerning the planning and execution of Mr. 
Burke’s murder occurred on the telephone, at Sharon Burke’s 
home, and at a business establishment.  There was an overt 
act in furtherance of this conspiracy when Appellant 
conducted target practice at the Burke residence the day 
before the shooting. 
The second conspiracy had a completely different motive and 
objective, to harm Mr. Mehl.  That conspiracy was not 
formed until March 27, 1984, long after the agreement to kill 
Mr. Burke was in place and only when it became apparent 
that Mr. Mehl was going to be present with Mr. Burke at 
work.  The discussions over what to do about Mr. Mehl 
occurred only between Sharon Burke and Appellant and were 
conducted at the Burke home and in the car on the way to 
Hemlock Farms.   
Thus, the conspiracies involved: 1) different victims, Mr. 
Burke and Mr. Mehl; 2) different objectives, to kill Mr. Burke 
and to harm Mr. Mehl; 3) different co-conspirators; 4) 
different time frames; and 5) different locations for the 
agreements.  Thus, the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth was sufficient to sustain 
Appellant’s conviction of two counts of conspiracy.4 
                                              
4 As explained later, although the reference to target practice by Gibbs and 
conversations with Gibbs at a business establishment lack support in the trial record, this 
error does not change our conclusion. 
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(App. at 154–55).  On December 18, 2007, Gibbs’s petition for allowance of appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was denied.  Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 939 A.2d 889 
(Pa. 2007) (table).   
 On March 12, 2008, Gibbs filed a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.           
§ 2254(b)(1), claiming, among other things, that the two conspiracy convictions were 
unsupported by the record and that the Superior Court’s decision to the contrary was an 
unreasonable application of federal law.  On October 25, 2013, the District Court issued a 
Memorandum and Order denying Gibbs’s habeas petition.  Gibbs v. Shannon, Civil No. 
3:CV-08-0462, 2013 WL 5781107 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2013).  In rejecting Gibbs’s 
challenge to the multiple conspiracy convictions, the District Court held that the Superior 
Court’s decision 
was objectively reasonable as illustrated by the evidence 
existing in the record and cited to by the state court that 
supported the existence of two separate conspiracies—
including different objectives, different parties, different 
locations and different times.  For these reasons, the court 
finds that the state court determination was not contrary to, or 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, and also was not based on an unreasonable determination 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented.  Consequently, 
there is no basis to grant federal habeas relief to Petitioner on 
this claim.   
 
Id. at *18.  Gibbs then filed a petition seeking a certificate of appealability with this 
Court.  On April 29, 2014, we granted a certificate of appealability on the challenge to 
the conspiracy convictions.5   
                                              
5 Gibbs has urged that we reconsider our denial of his request for a certificate of 





The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) and 2254(a).  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  Where, as here, a state 
court has decided the merits of a petitioner’s habeas claim, habeas relief under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) is appropriate only if 
the state court’s adjudication of the claim “was (1) ‘contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,’ or (2) ‘was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding.’”  Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)).   
III. 
 Gibbs presents two central arguments on appeal: (1) that the Superior Court made 
unreasonable findings of fact in light of the evidence presented at trial concerning his 
involvement in the conspiracy to murder Wayne Burke; and (2) that the record evidence 
is insufficient to sustain a separate conspiracy conviction to kill or harm Mehl.  We 
consider each contention in turn.   
                                                                                                                                                  
incrimination was violated by the government’s introduction in its case-in-chief of 
statements Gibbs made to a defense psychiatrist expert even though Gibbs did not present 
a mental capacity defense.  We remain convinced that reasonable jurists would not debate 
the District Court’s rejection of this claim.  In this regard, our holding in United States v. 
Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975), is dispositive.  In that case, we concluded that 
“the privilege against self-incrimination is not relevant” when a defendant voluntarily 
agrees to undergo a psychological examination.  Id. at 1045.  Gibbs does not point to any 
Supreme Court precedent that contradicts this holding.  Accordingly, we again decline to 




 A. The Superior Court’s Factual Determinations 
 We address Gibbs’s factual challenge first, as it will frame our review of the 
Superior Court’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence determination.  In considering this 
argument, we accord great deference to the Superior Court’s findings of fact.  “[A] state-
court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court 
would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.”  Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 
290, 301 (2010).  Rather, where a habeas petitioner challenges the factual basis for a state 
court’s decision, we may grant relief only if it was “‘based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.’”  Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)).   
 Gibbs argues that the Superior Court made an unreasonable finding of fact in 
asserting that “[t]here was an overt act in furtherance of this conspiracy when [Gibbs] 
conducted target practice at the Burke residence the day before the shooting,” March 26, 
1984.  (App. at 155.)  The Commonwealth does not point to any evidence in the record to 
substantiate this finding, and our review of the record reveals nothing to support this 
assertion.  Instead, the testimony of Hagen and Betsy Burke categorically establishes that 
Gibbs did not become involved in the plot to murder Wayne Burke until March 27, 1984.  
Furthermore, Hagen testified that her friend, Dean, conducted target practice at the Burke 
residence on March 27.  We thus conclude that the Superior Court’s factual determination 
in this regard is without record support and constitutes an unreasonable finding of fact.  
See Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 413 (5th Cir. 2012) (state court factual findings are 
unreasonable when “[t]he state advances no other factual basis” to support the findings 
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and the court’s “review of the record reveals none”).  Therefore, we do not consider this 
factual determination when evaluating Gibbs’s remaining argument.   
Our determination that the Superior Court made an unreasonable factual finding, 
however, is not dispositive.  As we explained in Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 
235–36 (3d Cir. 2004), “what factual findings remain to support the state court decision 
must still be weighed under the overarching standard of [§] 2254(d)(2).”   
 B. The Conspiracy Convictions 
 Gibbs contends that the record is insufficient to support the jury’s finding that 
there were two separate conspiracies, one to murder or harm Mehl and the other to 
murder or harm Burke.6  Gibbs maintains that the Superior Court’s decision to the 
contrary violated his due process rights under In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 
(1970), and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979).  In considering the Superior 
Court’s decision, we are bound by AEDPA’s “highly deferential standard for evaluating 
state-court rulings,” Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997), which “demands 
that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt,” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 
U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam).  “This distinction creates ‘a substantially higher 
threshold’ for obtaining relief than de novo review.”  Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 
(2010) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)).  We defer to the state 
court’s determination “so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of 
                                              
6 Gibbs concedes there was sufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy to 
murder Wayne Burke, which was later reduced to conspiracy to commit aggravated 
assault.  (Appellant’s Br. at 34.)  The practical impact of the convictions on separate 
conspiracy counts was to increase his minimum prison term by five years and his 
maximum term by ten years.   
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[that] decision.”  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. 
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).  “Indeed, ‘a federal habeas court may not issue the 
writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant 
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.’  
Rather, that application must be ‘objectively unreasonable.’”  Renico, 559 U.S. at 
773 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409–11 (2000)) (citations omitted).   
 Gibbs asserts that “all of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at [his] 
third trial unequivocally indicates that there was but one conspiracy, the objective of 
which was to murder Wayne Burke.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 34.)  Gibbs points out that 
under Pennsylvania law, “[i]f a person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is 
guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the same 
agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 903(c).  We 
have previously noted that § 903(c) requires the Commonwealth to prove “beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] entered into two agreements or two conspiratorial 
relationships, one to kill [the first victim] and another to kill [or harm another victim].”  
Robertson v. Klem, 580 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original).   
 In Robertson, we held that the evidence adduced at the petitioner’s state-court trial 
was insufficient to support two conspiracy convictions stemming from a simultaneous 
double murder, despite the Superior Court’s determination otherwise.  Id. at 165.  In that 
case, the defendants acted in concert, used a single weapon, and murdered both victims at 
the same time and in the same location.  Id. at 161–62.  Our review of the record revealed 
that “the Commonwealth simply failed to introduce any direct or circumstantial evidence 
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to suggest that the murders were the result of multiple conspiracies.”  Id. at 166 
(emphasis added).  Because the record was wholly silent as to any separate agreement—
i.e., there was simply no evidence to support an inference that there were two separate 
agreements—we concluded that habeas relief was warranted.  Id. at 167. 
 In Robertson, however, “[t]he only reason given by the Superior Court to support 
its conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to establish two conspiracies was that there 
were two victims.”  Id.at 166.  Here, the Superior Court held that the existence of two 
victims was only part of the evidence supporting the two conspiracy convictions.  More 
specifically, the testimony presented during Gibbs’s third trial established that each of the 
conspirators—Sharon Burke, Hagen, Dean, Betsy Burke, and Gibbs—explicitly or 
implicitly demonstrated their agreement to murder Wayne Burke prior to Sharon Burke 
mentioning Mehl.  As to the second conspiracy, only Sharon Burke and Gibbs agreed to 
harm or kill Mehl.  The Superior Court also noted that the conspiracies developed over 
distinct timelines and were formed at separate times.   
 Testimony from Hagen and Betsy Burke bears out these distinctions.  Hagen 
testified that, starting in February and continuing into late March of 1984, Sharon Burke 
was the mastermind of the plot to murder Wayne Burke, bringing each of the other 
conspirators into the fold.  After Sharon Burke convinced Hagen to join her efforts 
sometime in March of 1984, Hagen helped recruit several potential shooters, including 
her boyfriend at the time, Gary Huth.  Hagen explained that Sharon Burke specifically 
asked Huth “if [he] would kill my husband.”  (App. at 419.)   
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 On March 26, 1984, at Sharon Burke’s insistence, Hagen agreed to find a different 
shooter after Huth refused to participate.  Hagen stated that Sharon Burke told her to ask 
her friends “[i]f they would kill my stepfather,” Wayne Burke.  (App. at 420.)  That same 
evening, March 26, Betsy Burke first became aware of the developing plot to murder 
Wayne Burke.  Betsy Burke testified that Sharon Burke told her that “they were planning 
on killing my father for the insurance money.”  (App. at 798.)   
 On March 27, acting on Sharon Burke’s instructions, Hagen successfully 
convinced her friend, Dean, to join the plot.  Dean initially agreed to be the shooter, 
going so far as to conduct target practice at the Burke residence on the night of the 
murder.  However, Dean did not feel comfortable when firing the gun, so she suggested 
they contact Gibbs.  That same night, with Sharon Burke and Hagen listening in on the 
call, Dean convinced Gibbs to join the conspiracy.  Hagen testified that during this call, 
Dean told Gibbs that the plan was to kill “Bonnie Hagen’s stepfather.”  (App. at 428.)   
 At around 9 p.m. on March 27, Gibbs was picked up and brought to the Burke 
residence.  Once there, either Sharon Burke or Hagen provided Gibbs with dark clothing 
to wear while he carried out the crime, along with a blue bandana to cover his face.  
Sharon Burke also gave him a loaded gun.  As Sharon Burke drew out a map of the 
housing development’s security office, Hagen recalled that Betsy Burke showed Gibbs a 
picture of Wayne Burke “so that [Gibbs] knew what [he] looked like.”  (App. at 436.)     
 On the other hand, the conspiracy to kill Mehl did not form until the evening of 
March 27, 1984 at around 9:30 p.m., when Sharon Burke told Gibbs that Mehl would be 
working alongside Wayne Burke.  After Sharon Burke informed Gibbs that he may have 
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to harm or kill Mehl to get to Wayne Burke, the record is notably devoid of any evidence 
tending to show that the other conspirators agreed with or provided aid to this facet of the 
plan.  Taken as a whole and viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
evidence supports the Superior Court’s conclusion that there was two conspiracies, 
having different conspirators, separate timelines, distinct agreements, and different 
victims.   
 Robertson does not compel us to reach a different conclusion.  There, we 
principally based our holding on the Commonwealth’s failure to offer any “evidence to 
suggest that [the conspirators] reached separate agreements related to each murder.”  580 
F.3d at 166.  As discussed above, the evidence of two separate agreements—one to kill 
Wayne Burke, and one to harm or kill Mehl—formed at separate times between different 
conspirators distinguishes this case from Robertson.  In light of AEDPA’s highly 
deferential standard, we cannot conclude that the Superior Court’s decision was based 
upon an unreasonable finding of fact or reflected an unreasonable application of clearly 
established federal law.  Gibbs has failed to meet his high burden and, thus, the District 
Court properly denied habeas relief. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying 
Gibbs’s petition for habeas relief.  
Barry Gibbs v. Robert Shannon 




AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part 
I would grant Mr. Gibbs habeas relief on his double-jeopardy claim.  Even 
viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and affording its 
state-court decisions the deference owed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), I believe no 
reasonable juror could conclude that the Commonwealth sustained its burden of proving 
two separate conspiracies beyond a reasonable doubt.  I thus partially dissent.1   
A person who conspires “to commit a number of crimes . . . is guilty of only one 
conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or 
continuous conspiratorial relationship.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 903(c).  Because 
conspiracies often involve a number of subagreements, distinguishing between a single 
conspiracy and multiple conspiracies can be a challenging task.  The key is to determine 
whether there is “but one scheme, one enterprise, one conspiratorial web.”  United States 
v. McBrown, 149 F.3d 1176 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 
1234, 1249 (5th Cir. 1978), on reh’g, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Albernaz 
v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981)).  If a court erroneously treats “each stitch in that 
web . . . as a separate conspiracy, infinite bases for liability could be confected.”  
Rodriguez, 585 F.2d at 1250. 
                                              
1 For the reasons stated by my colleagues, I agree Gibbs is not entitled to a Certificate of 
Appealability on the issue of whether admission of the psychiatric testimony violated his 
Fifth Amendment rights.    
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Pennsylvania courts consider the totality of the circumstances to aid in this 
endeavor.  Commonwealth v. Barnes, 871 A.2d 812, 820 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), aff’d, 924 
A.2d 1202 (Pa. 2007).  Although the precise test is flexible, the seven factors most 
commonly considered are: “[t]he number of overt acts in common”; “the locations in 
which the alleged acts took place”; “the time period during which the alleged acts took 
place”; “the extent to which the purported conspiracies share a common objective”; “the 
degree to which interdependence is needed for the overall operation to succeed”; “the 
similarity in methods of operation”; and “the overlap of personnel.”  Commonwealth v. 
Andrews, 768 A.2d 309, 316 (Pa. 2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Koehler, 737 A.2d 
225, 245 (Pa. 1999)).  Application of these factors to the facts of this case leads me to 
conclude the two supposedly separate conspiracies were but one.   
(1) Common Overt Acts: As my colleagues concede, the Superior Court started 
off on the wrong foot by finding, without any support in the record, that Gibbs engaged in 
the act of target practice the day before the shooting to further the Wayne Burke (but not 
the Mehl) conspiracy.  No target practice by Gibbs ever occurred; it was Jennifer Dean 
who practiced shooting the gun, and that happened the day of the shooting.  The acts of 
the two conspiracies were precisely the same, including Gibbs changing into less 
conspicuous clothes, Sharon Burke providing a gun and driving to Hemlock Farms, and 
Gibbs firing shots that killed Mehl but were aimed at Wayne Burke.   
(2) Locations of the Overt Acts: Equally devoid of record support is the state 
court’s finding that “[c]onversations with [Gibbs] concerning the planning and execution 
of Mr. Burke’s murder occurred on the telephone, at Sharon Burke’s home, and at a 
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business establishment,” while “[t]he discussions over what to do about Mr. Mehl . . . 
were conducted at the Burke home and in the car on the way to Hemlock farms.”  In fact, 
Gibbs never spoke of Wayne Burke’s murder “at a business establishment,” and Gibbs 
also discussed killing Burke in transit to Hemlock Farms together with the conversation 
concerning Mehl.  The conspiracies thus overlapped in their geographic scopes.  
(3) Time Period of the Overt Acts: Not only did the overt acts occur at identical 
locations, they took place at identical times.  My colleagues conclude this factor weighs 
in the opposite direction by focusing on the point in time the different agreements were 
formed.  But the relevant inquiry is not “the precise time at which each objective [of a 
single continuing conspiracy] was conceived.”  Andrews, 768 A.2d at 316 (quoting 
Model Penal Code § 5.03 explanatory note)).  Rather, it is the sequence and span of the 
overt acts and whether “the second object was agreed to before attainment of the first.”  
Developments in the Law—Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 930 (1959); see also 
United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 213 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, because the overt acts 
occurred in a continuous, uninterrupted sequence and because the timeframe of the Mehl 
conspiracy was subsumed within that pertaining to the attempted murder of Wayne 
Burke, this factor augurs in favor of Gibbs.     
(4) Presence of Common Objective: I also disagree with the majority that the 
conspiracies were not united by a single overarching purpose: to murder Wayne Burke.  
In identifying the goal of harming or killing Mehl as a second, independent objective, the 
majority fails to recognize that the assault or attempted murder of Mehl was never the 
group’s ultimate goal.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lore, 487 A.2d 841, 855 (Pa. Super. 
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Ct. 1984) (concluding there was only a single conspiracy where the coconspirators agreed 
to commit separate criminal acts all aimed at the ultimate goal of avoiding detection for 
murder).  As Bonnie Hagan Sullivan testified at trial, Sharon Burke instructed Gibbs that 
“‘if you have to injure [Mehl] to get through Wayne [Burke] injure him,’ but . . . ‘don’t 
just shoot him and then shoot Wayne, try not to kill him.’ . . . Then, at some point, 
[Sharon said] ‘well, if you have to go through [Mehl] to get to Wayne, then go through 
him to get to Wayne.’”  Bottom line: the overall goal remained the same.   
(5) Interdependence of the Schemes: Closely related to whether there was one 
overarching goal is the degree of interdependence between the schemes.  This element 
weighs in favor of a single conspiracy where the evidence indicates that one aspect of the 
scheme is “necessary or advantageous to the success of another aspect of the scheme or 
to the overall success of the venture.”  United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 
1989) (quoting United States v. DeVarona, 872 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1989)).  As the 
trial judge aptly noted, the purported agreement to kill Mehl was a “contingent 
conspiracy”—the coconspirators saw no point to injuring or killing him save for 
facilitating Wayne Burke’s murder.  Thus, despite my colleagues’ and the state court’s 
failure to consider this factor, it also supports a single conspiracy.   
(6) Similarity of the Methods of Operation:  Analysis of the sixth relevant 
factor is likewise nowhere to be found in my colleagues’ and the state court’s opinions, 
though the methods of operation were identical.  Gibbs purportedly aimed the gun barrel 
at both men at precisely the same time and did nothing to further the murder of Mehl that 
he had not already done to further his attempted murder of Burke.   
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(7) Overlap in Personnel:  Finally, it seems clear to me that the same group of 
individuals were involved in both parts of the scheme, as not one of the four women 
(Sharon Burke, Jennifer Dean, Bonnie Hagan Sullivan, and Betsy Burke) left Gibbs’s 
side the night of the murder as preparations took place in the Burke trailer and during the 
drive to Hemlock Farms.  In concluding that “the record is notably devoid of any 
evidence tending to show that” anyone other than Gibbs and Sharon Burke “agreed with 
or provided aid to th[e] facet of the plan” concerning Mehl, my colleagues overlook that 
an agreement to partake in criminal activity “need not be formal by express words”—it 
“may be inferred from concerted action.”  Commonwealth v. DiEmidio, 182 A.2d 537, 
540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962), rev’d on other grounds, 188 A.2d 750 (Pa. 1963).  Thus, that 
Jennifer, Bonnie, and Betsy “stood by silently” while Mehl was discussed is sufficient 
evidence to conclude they “acquiesce[d] in th[e] enlarged criminal enterprise.”  State v. 
Crosswell, 612 A.2d 1174, 1181 (Conn. 1992) (emphasis added).   
In addition to all seven factors weighing in Gibbs favor, I cannot ignore that the 
Commonwealth has made its own bed.  Both in its opening and closing arguments at trial, 
it argued that all the charged activities, including the murder of Mehl, were part of a 
single, ongoing plan to kill Wayne Burke.  Moreover, the Commonwealth’s position on 
appeal that Jennifer Dean, Bonnie Hagan Sullivan, and Betsy Burke did not participate in 
Mehl’s murder is curious given that all three pled guilty for their role in that crime (just 
as they did for their role in the attempted murder of Wayne Burke).  Though I don’t mean 
to suggest that tack was improper, prosecutors cannot urge “courts [to] take a broad view 
of conspiracy” at trial to secure convictions yet advocate for “a narrow view in reviewing 
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a . . . double jeopardy claim.”  United States v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 433, 
449 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).  The easy manipulation of the conspiracy doctrine may make it 
the “darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery,” Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 
263 (2d Cir. 1925) (Hand, J.), but there must be limits to allowing “substantive law [to be 
used as] an empty container whose content [the prosecution] may regulate at its 
pleasure,” Ashland-Warren, 537 F. Supp. at 449. 
Despite my belief that Gibbs’s conspiracy convictions violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, I would reject his invitation to grant him a new trial for that violation.  Where, as 
here, the multiple conspiracy “counts are not inconsistent, but instead overlapping,” 
retrial is not the appropriate remedy.  United States v. Mori, 444 F.2d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 
1971).  However, to the extent the Commonwealth argues the constitutional violation 
may be remedied simply by re-imposing a general sentence without vacating one of the 
conspiracy convictions, that approach would also be incorrect.  United States v. Ward, 
626 F.3d 179, 185 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010).  The proper remedy is for the state court to vacate 
one of the conspiracy convictions and resentence him on the remaining counts.   
Because I part ways with my colleagues on Mr. Gibbs’s double-jeopardy claim, I 
respectfully dissent in part.  
